Written August 22, 2026
Leagues Cup 2026 - Final Scores: FC Dallas 1-0 C.D. Guadalajara, Seattle Sounders 1-2 C.D. Guadalajara
The second Leagues Cup match for Chivas kicked off at FC Dallas’ temporary venue in San José, California. As throughout their US stint, Chivas played in front of a crowd that made the venue feel distinctly like home. Chivas showcased flexibility in attacking rotations, shifting numerical superiority across the field to create advantages. With no impact on league standings, this tactical flexibility allowed Gabriel Milito to sample positional relationships in attack.
Chivas in possession against FC Dallas
Chivas in possession against the Seattle Sounders (Camberos subbed in for B. González)
Chivas’ base structure was a 3-1-4-2. Fernando Rubén González was the lone holding midfielder and Armando “Hormiga” González and Ángel Sepúlveda were the two strikers out front. In possession, this formation shifted into a flexible 3-2-3-2. The shape remained highly dynamic in possession, with players maintaining positional responsibilities as opposed to fixed positions. Chivas focused on creating wide overloads through the forward progression of their wide center-backs.
During build-up, Chivas maintained central progression though compensation. Omar Govea dropped deeper to sit beside F. González, giving Chivas two central options. F. González dropped into the back line to allow the wide center-backs, Diego Campillo and Miguel Gómez, to progress forward. This left Govea as the lone central option. Roberto Alvarado dropped into central midfield to assist Govea and progress the ball. Subsequently, Hormiga dropped into attacking midfield to provide a central option between Dallas’s midfield and defensive lines.
This rotation was highly effective at creating wide overloads against Dallas’ low block. Nevertheless, Dallas wanted Chivas to attack from outside. As Campillo and Gómez drove forward, wide-midfielders Richard Ledezma and Bryan González shifted wider and higher. Ledezma and B. González became wide outlet passes as well as combination partners. Right-sided duo Campillo and Ledezma frequently produced 2 vs. 1 situations against the Dallas wing-back. Campillo’s forward progression also created 3 vs. 2 scenarios if F. González or Alvarado provided a central option. On the left side of the pitch, Gómez and B. González experienced similar success with help from Govea or Alvarado. The better Chivas became at exploiting the space Dallas conceded, the more their attack was funneled towards the areas Dallas were willing to concede. By the fortieth minute, 41% of Chivas attacks came down the left wing.
Dallas set up in a low block anchored by five across the back. By virtue of their positioning, isolating the Dallas wing-back did not produce a defensive crisis for the home side. Dallas pressed outwards, rarely losing their compact central formation. As a result, Chivas were forced into playing wide, airborne crosses into the box. These crosses, although dangerous, barely produced shots on target. The two-striker occupation did little to disrupt Dallas’ central compactness. Hormiga and Sepúlveda’s positioning kept the home side’s back three centrally focused without dismantling their structure.
To remedy the situation, Hormiga would drop into midfield to provide an outlet for deep-lying playmakers. This enabled Sepúlveda to make runs into the box and provided pockets of space for the creativity of Alvarado. Hormiga only managed to get fifteen touches on the ball before his substitution in the second half. Despite his positioning, Chivas rarely used him as an outlet pass. This did not present an issue per se. If Hormiga’s movement left gaps for other players to occupy centrally, his value would not be on the ball. Because Hormiga’s movement neither resulted in midfield rotation nor converted him into an outlet pass, the rotation lost its attacking value.
Chivas’ best opportunities came at the end of the first half. Dallas pressed higher for the final minutes of the half following a counter-attacking opportunity. This provided space to exploit in the center of the field. In the 43rd minute, Romo plays wide to Ledezma out of the back. Ledezma passes to Alvarado on the wing. Romo receives the ball again, ahead of Alvarado on the right side of the box. His first-time ball into the second six finds Gómez. The shot goes wide (as shown in Figures One and Two). Barely two minutes later, Alvarado drops into defensive midfield to receive the ball. The ball goes past Alvarado and finds its way to Hormiga in the center of the pitch. Hormiga plays wide to Alvarado. Hormiga receives the ball back on the right side of the box. His shot is not a clean strike. Against Dallas’ mid-block press, Chivas created two of their most dangerous sequences of the match. In both passages of play, the away side used central movement to break down Dallas’ mid-block. Hormiga’s movement into midfield and Alvarado’s central playmaking finally proved effective.
Dallas raised the question of whether Chivas could successfully redistribute one of their forwards into a deeper central position. This would give them another player capable of combining at the top of the area and turning wide overloads into central penetration. Hormiga’s rotation produced one of Chivas’ most dangerous sequences of the match, but its success was limited to select moments late in the first half. Despite retaining 72% of overall possession, Chivas’ struggles to create centrally left them without a goal. Four days later, Gabriel Milito fielded a new attacking structure against the Seattle Sounders, offering a different answer to the same problem.
The Seattle Sounders posed a different challenge from that of Dallas’ low block. Seattle’s mid-block press afforded Chivas greater access to central areas. Gabriel Milito exploited this modification, starting Brian Gutiérrez in midfield alongside F. González and Alvarado. Gutiérrez was given less defensive responsibility than his compatriot Govea. The Chicago-born midfielder was tasked operating between the lines and creating central attacking opportunities. This forced F. González to retain his role as Chivas’ defensive screen with less support in transition. Defensively, this produced a trade-off: more attacking options through the center at the expense of the defensive security provided by a double pivot. If F. González or Romo were caught high during a turnover, Seattle could exploit the vacated, midfield space.
Nevertheless this trade-off proved worthwhile. To ensure options in build-up, Gutiérrez dropped into midfield to take up the role of a deep-lying playmaker. Jordán Carrillo, the positional replacement for Hormiga, also dropped deeper to provide a central outlet. This both provided space for the right-sided forward Ricardo Marín to exploit, and opened space for Hugo Camberos to cut inside. The 19-year-old Camberos, subbed on for an injured Bryan González in the 23rd minute, increased central rotations with Carrillo and Gutiérrez. This forced Seattle’s three center-backs to contend with constant movements from wide to center. Subsequently, this decreased the predictability of Chivas’ wide overloads and stretched Seattle’s defensive references.
These central pockets converted into attacking opportunities at the top of the box. In the 39th minute, Carrillo receives the ball towards the left touchline. Sensing his inability to cross, he plays the ball back to Camberos. Via F. González, the ball finds Romo at the top of the box. The ball is flicked behind the Seattle back line to Gutiérrez inside the area. Gutiérrez goes down. Camberos had also made a run into the left side of the box into the space vacated by Carrillo (as shown in Figure Three). These forward rotations from wide to center allowed for passing combinations at the top of the area. Chivas frequently slipped passes through from this position, attacking a less crowded area than with the lofted crosses sent into Dallas’ six-yard box.
